What do WWI and the sea have in common? Introduction to the special issue "The Great War and the Sea" by Mees, J.
The sea played a particularly important part in the First World 
War. A part to which too little attention has been paid. This is one 
of the reasons why the Flanders Marine Institute (VLIZ) thought 
it appropriate to devote a special issue of the De Grote Rede 
magazine to this topic on the occasion of the centenary of the 
First World War. In addition to thirteen leading articles and seven 
one-page sections, this issue also contains a few explanatory 
maps, a glossary and the etymological explanation of the principal 
toponyms of the Flemish front area (see: “Sea-related words”).
Initially it did not appear as if the North Sea and in particular the 
Flemish coast and Flanders Fields would be of great importance. 
After all, when Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von 
Moltke inherited the strategic plan of his predecessor Alfred von 
Schlieffen, he stuck to the latter’s central idea: in the early stages 
of the war, an offensive had to eliminate the French land forces 
as quickly as possible. The coastal area therefore fell completely 
outside the scope of his plan. Besides, he reasoned, once the 
Germans would be victorious, the Belgian territory, including its 
seaports, could obviously be considered as permanently acquired. 
All options for further military use were then open.
However, he had not reckoned with the Kaiserliche Marine 
(Imperial German Navy). The latter, under the command of Admiral 
Alfred von Tirpitz, envisaged a much broader war scenario and 
was therefore highly interested in the Belgian coast (see: “The 
Imperial German Navy wants to conquer the Belgian Coast”). 
Possession of the Belgian ports would considerably improve its 
strategic position with regard to the British navy. It is no wonder 
then that, after no more than a few weeks, a sizeable German 
infantry division consisting of marines and seamen entered the 
Belgian territory to join battle. Their commanders had not set 
their sights on the French land forces, but on the major seaport 
of Antwerp. However, the Belgian army initially stood in their 
way. The Belgian troops were therefore their fi rst and foremost 
adversaries.
The British Royal Navy was also quick to understand that the 
Belgian territory was more than just a corridor to Paris for the 
main body of the German land forces. First Lord of the Admiralty 
Winston Churchill sent the Royal Marines to Antwerp. Their 
intervention was improvised and their numbers were too small 
to make more than a symbolic contribution. But the trend had 
IN
TR
O
D
U
CT
IO
N What do WWI and 
the sea have in 
common? 
Introduction to the 
special issue “The 
Great War and the 
Sea”
Jan Mees
VLIZ director 
3
Grote Rede36_EN.indd   3 9/06/14   13:04
4 VLIZ • DE GROTE REDE • 2013 •  36
been set: the admiralties had all set their sights on the Belgian 
ports and the coastal area. From late September 1914 onwards, 
the Germans advanced further to the north. The French admirals 
feared Germany had in the mean time set its eye on the coastal 
area. To avert the danger, the French admiralty formed a force of 
6000 seamen and marines, and sent it to Flanders. They had to 
prevent the Germans from reaching the ports. 
The Belgian high command had no tradition of maritime thinking 
(see: “Belgian ‘naval’ force?”). The coast therefore did not play 
any part in their military strategy. However, the Belgian army did 
have a few armoured vessels at the fortified city of Antwerp to 
control the river Scheldt. Specialised engineering companies had 
a thorough command of the construction of pontoon bridges. Their 
engineers also studied the hydrology and the tides on account 
of their potential importance in defensive warfare. As a result, 
defensive inundations already took place in the earliest stages of 
the war. Yet after the first week of October 1914 the fortified city 
of Antwerp had to be abandoned and the Belgian army sent its 
mobile unit to the coasts across the pontoon bridges. The hope 
of establishing a new base and line of defence there would be 
realised only in the second half of October, with the inundation of 
the Yser plain as an important strategic tool (see: “The inundation 
of the Yser plain”). Partly because the Belgian army controlled 
the complex of floodgates and sluices of the river Yser and other 
watercourses and canals at Nieuwpoort, they were able to halt the 
German advance at the Yser by flooding the area with seawater. 
In the meantime, French navy troops or fusiliers marins fought 
alongside the Belgians near Diksmuide. During this battle, the 
troops were supported by heavy artillery from French and British 
navy units positioned close to the beach.
This did not prevent the German marine division from taking the 
ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. Commanding Admiral Ludwig von 
Schröder was delighted to hear that the harbour facilities were 
virtually intact. Nevertheless, it would take time to turn the narrow 
coastal strip into a safe haven for German warships. That was only 
possible by installing numerous heavy coastal batteries with guns 
of battleship size (see: “Concrete in the dunes: German coastal 
defences during the First World War“). As a result, it became very 
risky for French and British surface ships to shell German bases. 
Meanwhile, the German marines had the Belgian and French 
troops within range in the sector between the sea and Diksmuide. 
Especially at Nieuwpoort the presence of French marines was 
strikingly strong, as French Admiral Ronarc’h feared a German 
breakthrough in the direction of the naval base of Dunkirk and the 
key port of Calais.
But what about the Belgian civilians, the inhabitants of the 
coastal area, the fishermen and the crews of the dozens of Belgian 
freighters and passenger ships? Those who had a seaworthy boat 
at their disposal usually had been able to escape in time. As a 
consequence, unoccupied Belgium had quite a lot of shipping 
capacity. This was a blessing for the Belgian government in exile, 
based in the French city of Le Havre. They were accompanied by 
a few senior officials from the Marine Affairs Administration, who 
provided the necessary know-how. Flemish fishermen were able 
to contribute to the food supply from French and British ports 
(see: “Fisheries and the First World War”). And a large part of 
the freighters were deployed to supply occupied Belgium with 
essential food aid from other continents via the Netherlands, that 
had remained neutral.
Once the German Kaiserliche Marine had converted its part of 
the coast into an impregnable fortress garrisoned with several 
tens of thousands of troops, the time was ripe for equipping the 
harbours as bases of operations. The German occupying forces 
used new types of U-boats and torpedo boats, specially designed 
for these shallow coastal waters, to take aggressive action against 
the French and British navy as well as the merchant fleet (see: 
“German U-boat development during World War I”). U-boats 
would play an absolute key role in the German strategy to bring 
the Allies to their knees. Losses forced the Belgian headquarters 
to create a Depôt des Equipages (Crew Depot). In this way 
reserves of seamen could be made available to replace the neutral 
crew members who pulled out and the sailors who had drowned. 
These included gunners on merchant ships who had to repel 
attacks from German U-boats. Belgian military engineer Pierre 
Van Deuren even transformed his recently designed trench mortar 
into a version suitable for engaging U-boats, even when they were 
submerged (see: “The Belgian cavalry, a German U-boat and the 
Van Deuren mortar”).
The increasing German threat at sea was a thorn in the flesh of 
the British in particular. In 1917 Field Marshal Haig decided to put 
everything at stake to dislodge the Germans from the Flemish 
coastal area. The main offensive was planned from Ypres, but the 
Nieuwpoort sector was also a starting point of a push that had to 
eliminate the German coastal defences. However, the enemy was 
able to eliminate the British threat at Nieuwpoort through a pre-
emptive operation code-named “Strandfest”. When the offensive 
from Ypres subsequently got bogged down at Passchendaele, the 
battle appeared to be over. The positions of the Kaiserliche Marine 
on the Flemish coast were now stronger than ever.
For the civilian population this was an unprecedented catastrophe, 
partly because the food supply left a lot to be desired (see: 
“Fish consumption during WWI”). In the early stages of the 
war, it was still possible for soldiers to relax in the coastal town 
of De Panne. The town was out of reach of the German heavy 
artillery, which allowed the construction of recreational facilities, 
barracks, hospitals and nursing facilities at this site. It also served 
as the temporary Belgian capital, since the head of state and 
commander-in-chief King Albert I resided there. But the peace and 
quiet in De Panne did not last. The hostilities gradually reached 
the rear of the front sectors in the Yser plain. In addition, the 
commanders increasingly imposed restrictions. This was the case 
in the area occupied by the Germans as well as in the zone where 
Belgian and French troops were active (see: “War child in occupied 
Blankenberge”). Beaches, dunes, polders and ports were fully 
militarised (see: “The accessibility and the role of the beach 
during WWI”). It became very difficult for civilians to survive there. 
This militarisation did not just consist of bunkers in the dunes 
and defensive barriers on the beach (see: “Coastal defence by 
the Allied forces behind the Yser front: about arms, water, sand 
and patients”). Dunes were also levelled and the white sand was 
used for making concrete and constructing railways and roads. 
Groundwater from the dunes was pumped up to serve as drinking 
water and the dunes were also used as drill grounds, where 
infantrymen practised military drills and learnt to advance through 
difficult terrain in a methodical fashion.
At first, the year 1918 did not bring any improvement. During the 
previous winter, Russia had ended its participation in the war, as 
a result of which the German supreme command could drastically 
reinforce their troops on the western front. From the early spring 
onwards, the German army therefore took the offensive on a 
massive scale. One of these offensives was aimed at taking the 
base of Calais, an essential link in the rearguard for the French, 
British and Belgian armies. Yet the advance came to a standstill 
near Kemmel Hill (Kemmelberg) and Merkem. Reaching the coast 
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turned out to be unfeasible and the offensive was abandoned. That 
same spring the British navy attempted to deny the German war ships 
use of the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge by blocking the channel 
with ships (see: “The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids”). These raids had 
little permanent effect. It was not until August 1918 that the military 
preponderance shifted to the Allies. From late September onwards 
the Allied troops in West Flanders were ready to take the offensive. 
Their advance was relatively slow due to fierce German resistance and 
in particular the difficult terrain. As a result, the Kaiserliche Marine 
managed to withdraw the Marine Corps and the Flanders Flotilla in an 
orderly manner. After four years, German control of the Flemish coast 
east of the Yser estuary had ended.
What remained was explosives lying around, spiked pieces of artillery, 
and inaccessible harbours and beaches (see: “Naval mines, 
“decorative” and deadly”). A form of battlefield tourism soon developed 
in the ravaged war zone (see: “Battlefield tourism on the coast after 
WWI”). The marine scientists who had fled during WWI or had carried on 
one way or another could resume work (see: “Belgian marine scientists 
during WWI”). In addition, the seabed was littered with wrecks and 
naval mines (see: “The UNESCO convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage and maritime WWI heritage in the 
Belgian part of the North Sea”). Clearing and reconstruction took many 
years and huge sums of money. Incidentally, the sea itself also played an 
important role in this ‘cleanup’. The thousands of tonnes of chemical 
shells left behind by the German army all over Belgium were collected 
and transported by boat from Zeebrugge to a sandbank off the coast of 
Knokke-Heist, where they were dumped. At present we are still 
burdened with the notorious ammunition dump site on Paardenmarkt 
Bank (see: “Paardenmarkt Bank, a WWI ammunition dump site off the 
Belgian coast”). Although the Great War has been largely wiped from 
our collective memory and filed away in archives, it has not disappeared. 
We still find traces everywhere, visible ones but particularly many 
invisible ones, as they are hidden beneath the sand or the water surface 
(see: “What is the present impact of WWI on the coast?”; “The First 
World War in the classroom”). 
The Flanders Marine Institute is very pleased that it was able to provide 
its services and bring this multifaceted war history of the Belgian coast 
and territorial waters back into the limelight while revealing a great 
deal of unknown or ‘forgotten’ facts thanks to the disinterested and 
enthusiastic effort of numerous authors and experts. This was made 
possible by dozens of helpful people who contributed to this project. 
Their names and their special, original contributions can be found on 
the following pages. We are convinced that the results of their work 
will open a door to an unknown and unexpected past for many people. 
Without a doubt, this special issue of De Grote Rede will in turn be a 
starting point for further groundbreaking research. We are in any case 
delighted with the result and excited about this perspective.
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Battery – fortification
Hospital
Military training and distribution centre
Military airfield
Research laboratory
Hollandstellung
Cantelmo line
Flanders Fields
  Principal sites and constructions mentioned in this special WWI issue and located on the Flemish coast (VLIZ)
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